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dPlc,Planning,  and Resoarch
Debt  and International  Finance
It is now widely acknowleged that under certain  the creditors when a debtor is distressed. No
circumstances debt reduction can improve the  such institutional framework yet exists in the
welfare of both creditors and debtors.  A large  intemnational  setting. Under current incentives,
debt overhang can lead to inefficiencies that  voluntary debt relief is bound to mean no more
worsen the debtor's economic performance,  than a zontinuing nibbling away at the edges of
thereby diminishing the creditor's expected  the debt overhang, without real relief for the
returns.  Leading banks and intemational f-nan-  debtor or real benefits for the creditors.
cial institutions recognize this, but actual debt
reduction has been remarkably limited.  Bolivia  The author recommends "concerted debt
remains the sovereign debtor that has been able  restructuring," based on beiow-market interest
to negotiate a fairly comprehensive debt reduc-  rates, rather than "voluntary" debt reduction.
tion arrangement - and results have been  With concerted relief, all bVnks  would partici-
favorable.  pate jointly on a fairly equal basis.  The existing
debt would be rescheduled at below-market
Why has there been so little progress in debt  interest rates, with the rates based on various
reduction?  indicators of ability to pay and decided in
negotiations between the debtor country and
Debt reduction poses important collective  creditor banks. The interest payments could be
action problems that cannot be efficiently  made more secure for the banks by various
handled in the framework of "voluntary, market-  forms of credit enhancement, including collater-
based" approaches currently championed by the  alization, guarantees by the official creditor
World Bank and the rest of the creditor commu-  community, and escrow accounts in which
nity.  Important distortions arise in the negotiat-  export earnings are deposited for the purpose of
ing process because of the special position and  future debt servicing. This approach would
incentives of the money-center banks and the  provide the most direct mechanism for an effi-
recognized readiness of the official creditor  cient, equitable sharing of losses among the
community to contribute funds to avoid a break-  creditor banks.
down of creditor-debtor relations.
This kind of interest-rate reduction could be
Meaningful debt reduction requires an  easily managed in the context of an intemational
appropriate institutional setting to overcome  debt facility.  Whatever the approach, meaning-
collective action problems.  In the domestic  ful debt reduction will require the active partici-
economy, bankruptcy law provides the frame-  pation of the intemational community.
work for organizing the collective interests of
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1.  Introduction
It is now widely  recognized  that the overhang  of sovereign
debt is imposing  major costs not only on debtors  but also on
creditors,  by seriously  disrupting  the debtor economies. 1 The
World  Bank, in the 1988-89  edition  of the  World  Debt Tables  has
recently  recognized  that  the  debt  overhang  of the  heavily  indebted
countries (the  HICs) is "a burden . . . that reduces incentives to
undertake  sustainable  long-term  adjustment"  (p.xvi) The  costs  of
debt  overhang  have led  to a widespread  acceptance  of the  need  for
a  process  of debt reduction,  by the  World Bank  and others. The
major commercial  banks have, in rhetoric  at least, started  to
advocate  debt reduction  aa one step  out of the  current  crisis. 2
In  order  to  discuss the  potential usefulness of  debt
reduction  mechanisms,  it is useful  to have a working  definition.
lThe economic  crisis  in Latin  America,  and the role of tle
foreign  debt, is analyzed  in Sachs  (1988),  which  can be regarded
as a  companion  paper  to the  current  analysis.
2See for example,  the recent  statement  of the Institute  of
Internationa, Finance,  "The  Way  Forward  for  Middle-Income
Countries",  January 1989, which  states that  "the scopa  for
voluntary  debt reduction  should  be significantly  enlarged"  (p.2),
and that  creditor  governments  should  seek  ways to encourage  banks
to  "accelerate  the  application  of  voluntary, market-oriented
financing techniques that  reduce existing bank  debt"(p.4).
Similar,  Morgan Guaranty  Trust, in the December  1988 issue of
World  Financial  Markets  states  that  the  "multilateral
organizations  should  support  bank-debt  reduction,  for  example,  by
helping  debtors  to issue  new obligations  of enhanced  quality  and
retire  existing  ones  at a discount"  (p.  2).
1I will  define  debt  reduction  as  a restructuring  of the  outstanding
debt in a way that  reduces  the  expected  present  discounted  value
of  the  contractual  obligations  of  the  debtor.  Thus, "debt
reduction"  will mean something  more than simply lowering the
amount  of debt that  is owed  by repaying  principal. It  also  means
something  more than  converting  the  external  debt  into  an internal
debt  that  carries  the  same  or greater  debt  servicing  burden. 3 The
overall terms of repayment  must be eased in a present value
sense. 4 Thus, debt reduction  would include:  a rescheduling  of
debt at sub-market  interest  rates; a  cancellation  of part of
principal;  exit  bonds  with oub-market  interest  rates;  a  buyback  of
debt  at a discount  relative  to  face  value;  etc.
Despite the discussion  of debt reduction  mechanisms  in the
3Some kinds of debt conversion  give the creditor  a local
currency claim  in place of  the  external claim.  Typically,
however,  the local  currency  claim  is indexed,  and with a higher
interest  rate than on the  external  claim.  I  will not  count  that
as a case  of debt  reduction,  even  though  the  measured  cross-border
debt  is reduced.
41t is important  to make this basic point since the banks
have sometimes  used the term  "debt  reduction"  to mean little  more
than  a  reduction of  the  debt  through  a  straightforward
amortization  of  the debt, something  that the banks obviously
support,  but which brings  little  comfort  to the debtor  country!
Thus, in the recent  debt rescheduling  with Brazil,  completed  in
September  1988,  the  banks  advertised  that the  agreement  led to a
significant  $4.5  billion  reduction  of debt in 1988.  (See "Brazil
Financing  Plan,  1988-89",  Citicorp,  mimeo,  September  1988). $3.4
billion of  this  "debt reduction",  however, was  simply the
repayment  by  Brazil, at par, of arrears on earlier interest.
Similarly,  the banks advertised  that Brazil  would reap a $1.8
billion reduction in debt from a debt-equity  program in which
Brazil  would  buy the  debt from  the  banks  at par  value. But  since
a repurchase  at par is akin to a direct  amortization  of debt at
par,  this  will  not  be counted  as a debt  reduction  according  to the
definition  in the  text.
2past couple  of years,  Bolivia  remains  the  only country  that has
eliminated  a large  proportion  of its debt obligations  through  a
debt  reduction  program  (in  this  case,  through  a  buyback  of debt  at
a deep  discount). 5 In  other  countries,  of  which  Chile  is  the  most
notable,  debt  reduction  has  come  in  a  piecemeal  fashion,  mainly  as
part of debt-equity  swap programs,  and indirect  debt repurchase
Agreements. 6 Ironically,  we will stress  that debt-equity  swaps
represent a  kind  of  debt  reduction that  is  typically of
significant  harm  to the  debtor  country,  which  helps  to  explain  why
most countries have ce'ncelled  or very  sharply limited their
programs by  this point.  Moreover, much of  the actual debt
reduction  that has taken  place  has involved  private-sector  debt,
rather  than the restructured  public sector  debt that is at the
rore  of the  debt  crisis. Since  the  main  source  of the  debt  crisis
is  a  financially distressed public  sector, private  debt
conversions  might  be helpful,  but are unlikely  to play  more than
an incidental  role  in  resolving  the  debt  crisis.
In sum,  when the  banks advertise  "more  than  $26 billion'  of
debt reduction, 7 the  vast bulk of this amount  is private  sector
conversions  (approximately  $8.0 billion),  and debt-equity  swaps
and local conversions  (approximately  $16 billion),  versus only
about  $2  billion  of debt  buybacks  and  exit  bonds  for  public  sector
5See  Sachs  (1988b)  for  a detailed  discussion  of the  Bolivian
debt  buyback.
6See  Felipe Larrain (1988) for a  detailed  discussion  of
Chile's  experience  with  debt  reduction  mechanisms.
7See  the  Institute  of International  Finance,  OR-cit.,  p. 21.
3debt.  The vast bulk of debt reduction  has come in distinctiy
unhelpful  form,  not  the  kind that  is at the  center  of this  paper.
Note too  that  many  creditor  banks  have  substantially  reduced  their
LDC exnosure  by selling  their  claims  in the secondary  market to
other  institutions  that  now  hold  the  debt.  Such  operations  reduce
the  debt holdings  of the  banks,  but do not  reduce  the  debt  of the
debtor  countries,  since  they  merely  transfer  the  ownership  of the
claim  to another  creditor.
The  gap  between  the  rhetoric  of debt  reduction  and  the  harsh
reality  of debt negotiations  for the debtor  countries  has never
been greater. In the  past two  years,  debt  restructuring  programs
have done little  to satisfy  the financial  needs of the debtor
countries.  Only four new money  packages  were negoti4ted  in the
past two  years.  and  all  have  by now  collapsed. In fact  the  banks
have  become  increasingly aggressive in  recent negotiations,
unrestrained  by  any discipline  of public policy.  The banks
pressed for extensive debt-equity  swap programs and relending
provisions  for Brazil, thus contributing  markedly to Brazil's
hyperinflation,  while  providing  inadequate refinancing of
interest.  Citicorp  praised  the Brazilian  agreement  as the most
innovative  to  date,  only to  see  its  major  provisions  collapse  in a
matter  of 3  months. 8
The theme  of this paper  is simple. The failure  in the  last
two years to make real headway with debt reduction  is not an
8See  William Rhodes,  "An  Insider's Reflection on  the
Brazilian  Debt  Package,"  Wall Street  Journal,  October  14,  1988.
4accident.  Even when a  reduction  of the debt burden would be
beneficial  to the  broad class  of creditors  and debtors  alike,  it
is  unlikely to  emerge from  the  current structure of  debt
negotiations. Meaningful  debt reduction  requires  an appropriate
institutional  setting to  overcome important  collective  action
problems.  In the  domestic  economy,  bankruptcy  law provides  the
framework  for  organizing  the  collcctive  ino-rests  of the  creditors
in a  situation  of  financial distress  of  a  debtor.  In  the
international  setting,  no such  institutional  framework  yet  exists.
What is worrisome  about  current  discussions  is the  apparent
failure  to recognize  these serious  institutional  limitations  to
debt reduction. Almost all of the new-found  advocates  of debt
reduction  in the creditor  community  put enormous  stress  on the
fact  that  debt  reduction  should  be "voluntary"  and  "market  based",
without  paying  serious  attention  to the  extent  of debt reduction
that  is likely  to  be achieved  according  to these  guidelines. 9
Under the current incentives,  voluntary  debt relief  is bound to
mean  no more than a continuing  nibbling  away at the  edges  of the
debt  overhang,  without  real  relief  for  the  debtor  or real  b-nefits
for  the  creditors.
I will stress  that instead  of "voluntary"  debt  reduction,  we
instead  need "concerted"  debt  reduction. Again,  some  definitions
9Advocates  of voluntary  debt reduction  (VDR)  envision  that
debt reduction should  be achieved through  the transactions  in
which  each  bank  creditor  may  choose  whether  or not  to  participate.
Example of  VDR  include the  purchase of  debt  for  cash  (in
buybacks),  or the creation  of new financial  claims (e.g.  exit
bonds,  debt-equity  swaps)  which  each  bank  creditor  can  voluntarily
choose  to accept  in  exchange  for  the  existing  debt.
5are in order to understand  this point.  By "voluntary",  it is
usually  meant-that  each  bank should  be able to decide  whether  to
participate  in a debt reduction  scheme  (e.g.  each bank chooses
whether to accept  a given  exit bond in a swap for thp existing
debt).  I will contrast  this case with "concerted"  relief, in
which -a_U  of the banks jointly participate  on a  fairly  equal
basis.  It has long  been recognized  that  in the  case  of  new  money
packages, a  "concerted"  arrangement  rather than a  "voluntary"
arrangement  is needed.  The same is true with respect  to debt
reduction.
The banks  have some  rhetorical  success  in stressing  the  need
for "voluntary"  programs,  since  it appears  that  the  opposite  of a
"voluntary"  program must be  a coercive  program,  which sounds
unfair.  Voluntary  debt relief  seems  to  be morally  unassailable.
But, in truth,  the issue  is not  whether  debt  reduction  should  be
coercive  or not; the issue  is whether  &U  banks  should  commit  to
participate  in any given  debt  reduction  arrangement  (as  the  banks
have repeatedly  decided  in the  case  of new lending). This  paper
envisions  a negotiated.  concerted  form  of debt relief,  that  would
parallel  the kind of concerted  settlement  found  in a bankruptcy
proceeding,  and  found  in "new  money'  packages. 10
A  simple mechanism is at hand to achieve concerted  debt
reduction.  The existinz  debt should  be rescheduled  at sub-market
1OAt  the  risk  of  belaboring the  point,  I  distinguish
"voluntary"  from "concerted",  and "negotiated"  from  "unilateral".
A  meaningful  solution  will have to be negotiated,  rather than
unilateral;  but it will also have to be concerted,  rather  than
voluntary  (as  that  term  is  now  used).
6njterest  rates.  where the  rates  are guided  by various  indicators
of abilitj  to-'ay.  and are decided  in negotiations  between the
debtor  countrt  and the  creditor  banks. 11  This simple  mechanism
would treat all banks  symetrically,  facilitate  a  substantial
amount  of debt reduction,  and  be easily  accomplished  both legally
and  administratively.  In  addition  to  lowering  the  interest  rates,
the interest  payments  could be made more secure for the banks
through  various  means,  including  collateralization,  guarantees  by
the official creditor  community,  and escrow accounts  in which
export earnings are deposited  for the purpose of future debt
servicing,  and  so forth.  These alternative  forms of credit-
enhancement  are  at  the  core of  several proposals for  debt
reduction,  and  could  in fact  be flexibly  applied  on a  case-by-case
basis.
The kind of interest-rate  reduction  suggested  in this paper
could  be easily  managed  in the context  of an international  debt
facility,  which is one form  of instituting  a global  approach. I
will not focus further  on the facility  itself (details  may be
found  in Sachs,  1988),  focussing  instead  here on the problems  of
debt  reduction  for  each  particular  country.
One more  important  point about debt reduction should be
stressed  at the outset.  Meaningful  debt reduction  will require
the  active  participation  of the  international  community. The IMF
and World  Bank  will  have to  provide  technical  guidance  concerning
llThe  international  agencies  would  have an important  role in
providing  indicators  of debt  service  capacity.
7the appropriate  levels  of reduction;  the international  community
will  play  a 'role in structuring  the negotiations;  and  the
international  community  might  provide  crucial  credit  enhancement
as part  of the  debt  reduction  mechanism.  The  official  role  in  any
debt-reduction  agreement should be  predicated on  the  debtor
country's  participation  in an ongoing,  internationally  supervised
adjustment  program, subject to strong conditionalities. Debt
reduction must be matched by  responsible  policymaking  in the
debtor  country. As I  will stress,  the  prospect  of achieving  debt
reduction  can  by  itself  be  an  important spur  to  good
policymaking.
12
The paper proceeds  as follows. Section  2 describes  briefly
the efficiency  arguments  concerning  debt reduction,  and  provides
some circumstantial  evidence  in support  of the  basic  theory. It
also  stresses  why the  existing  approach  of "new  money  packages"  is
bound to fail.  Section  3 highlights  the  reasons  for  the  general
ineffectiveness  of "voluntary  debt  reduction"  mechanisms,  both  on
a  theoretical  and  empirical  basis.  Section 4  argues that
concerted debt  reduction, brought about  through sub-market
interest rates and with various forms of credit enhancement,
120ne of the myths about debt reduction  is that it would
reduce  the  incentive  for  reform. This  point  of view  hardly  seems
compelling  after 6 years of a  "tight  leash"  approach  in Latin
America  has left  the  region  in a shambles. The  prospects  of debt
reduction  could  do enormous  benefit  in  mobilizing  the  support  for
reform, as  I  shall stress.  Moreover, all  official credit
guarantees  on restructured  debt  should  be app .riately  protected
through conditionality,  and failures  of governments  to pay the
reduced  debt (thereby  triggering  the  official  guarantees)  can be
met  with stiff  sanctions.
8offers  the simplest,  most realistic,  and  most efficient  form of
debt  reductione Section  5  presents  some  conclusions.
2.  The  Basic  Efficiency  Case  for  Debt  Reduction
Under certain  circumstanc2s,  debt reduction  can improve  the
welfare  of creditors  as welx  as debtors,  because  a large  overhang
of debt can worsen the economic  performance  of the debtor  and
thereby  diminish  the  expected  returns  of the  creditor. This  point
is well known in the literature  on corporate  bankruptcy (see
Jackson,  1986),  and  was  first  stressed  in the  context  of sovereign
debt by Sachs (1986).  Bankruptcy  law is also founded  on the
proposition  that  efficient  debt  reduction  will normally  not  occur
in a decentralized  market  process,  since  each  individual  creditor
has the incentive  to press for full  payment  on its own claims,
even if collectively  it would  be in the collective  interests  of
the  creditors  to  reduce  the  debt  burden.  The  bankruptcy
settlement  cuts  through  this  fundamental  collective  action  problem
by enforcing  a  concerted  settlement  on the  creditors.
The  efficiency  gains  from  bankruptcy  are  seen  most  vividly  in
the case of corporate  reorganization  (Chapter  11 of the U.S.
Bankruptcy  code).  The main idea of corporate  reorganization  is
that  a  highly  indebted  firm  (with  negative  net  worth)  tay  be  worth
more to the creditors  if it remains  a going  concern  rather  than
being forced  into  liquidation,  and  yet the individual  actions  of
creditors  (in the absence  of bankruptcy  protection)  might force
the firm into liquidation  as the individual  creditors  race to
9seize  particular  assets  of the firm.  Less  dramatically,  even if
the existing  creditors  exercise  forbearance  in liquidating  the
firm,  the  overhang of  debt  (in  the  absence of  bankruptcy
protection)  can by itself  cripple  the normal  operations  of the
firm by: restrt1ting  access to trade financing;  hindering  the
maintainance  of long-term  suppliers  relations;  raising  the  cost  of
collecting  debts that are owed to the firm; and limiting  the
access  of the  firm  to the  long-term  capital  markets. 13
In a typical  corporate  reorganization,  it is recognized  that
the continued  efficient  operation  of the firm requires  that the
debt  burden  be reduced  to  manageable  levels,  in  order  to  avoid  the
risks  of  decapitalization  as  well  as the  various  inefficiencies  of
a debt  overhang. Thus,  while  a  bankruptcy  proceeding  'forces"  the
individual  creditors  to give  up part of their legal  claims,  and
indeed  reduces  the  contractual  obligations  of the  debtor,  it  does
so for  the  benefit  of the  creditors,  by preserving  the  capacity  of
the  debtor  to function  effectively  and  thereby  to service  as much
of the  debt  as  possible.
The process  of  bankruptcy  (and  specifically  the reduction  of
the  debt claims  on the  firm)  will typically  restore  the  access  of
the  firm  to  tae  capital markets, both  for  short-term  trade
financing, and  for  long-term borrowing for  fixed  capital
investment.  It is common in a bankruptcy  action  that once the
existing debts are reduced,  the bankrupt firm may immediately
13A11  of this is discussed  at great length in Jackson's
(1986)  outstanding  analysis.
10return  to  the  credit  markets  for  new  financing  based  on a  cleaned-
up  balance  sheet. 14
Seen in this light,  the most common  argument  against  debt
reduction  made by  the creditor  banks seems perverse.  It is
sometimes  argued  that  debt reduction  for a sovereign  borrower  is
harmful to debtor because it will block  the  return of  the
sovereign  to the loan  market.  In fact,  it is the  debt  overhang
itself that prevents the return of the sovereign  to the loan
market,  and the most effective  way to revive  lending  for trade
financing  and  fixed  capital  formation  is to  reduce  the  debt  burden
to a level  that  can  be serviced  by the  debtor.
Those  who  argue  against  debt  reduction  because  of an alleged
adverse  effect  on future  lending  confuse  the  effects  of two  kinds
of actions  on the debt.  A unilateral  and  hostile  suspension  of
payments  by a debtor  may indeed  delay  the  debtor's  return  to the
capital markets.1 5 Contrariwise,  an  agreed and  negotiated
reduction  of debt can sjeps the return  of the sovereign  to the
capital  market. Note,  for example,  that Indonesia  had acc:ss  to
commercial  market borrowing  just four years after Indonesia's
debts to foreign  governments  were substantially  reduced  in 1970.
The alleged  reputational  onus  against  a government  that  failed  to
honor  its  debts  simply  did  not  exist  in this  case.  If  the  creditor
14A recent example is the case of the bankrupt  Washington
Power  Supply  Company,  which  settled  with its  creditors  in December
1988, reducing  their  claims  substantially,  and then returned  to
the  capital  markets  immediately  with  significant  new  borrowing.
15It may still make sense as a measure of last resort,
however.
11banks are truly worried about a  sovereign's  future access to
lending,  then  .the  banks should  strive  to reduce  the debt burden
via negotiation,  rather  than cornering  the  debtor  into the need
for  unilateral  actions.
There is a resistance  in many quarters  to interpret  debtor
countries  as being in a state of bankruptcy.  Many observers,
starting  with  Cline  (1983),  have interpreted  the  debt  problem  as  a
liquidity  problem  rather  than  a solvency  problem. Others,  in the
tradition  of Eaton and Gersovitz  (1981),  view the issue as a
problem  of "willingness  to pay",  rather  than  ability  to pay.  In
fact,  the whole question  of whether the  debt poses  a liquidity,
solvency, or willingness-to-pay  problem has  turned out to be
rather  sterile. From  a purely  technological  point  of view,  there
is no  doubt that the  countries are  solvent: given existing
technologies  and national  resources,  the debts could surely  be
serviced  in the  long  term.
Even  so,  most governments  will  be unable  to service  the  debts
in entirety,  if they want to. 16 The  debt is  mostly  owed by the
public sector, where  political, economic, and  administrative
limitations  to debt servicing  present  a profound  barrier  to debt
servicing. Budget  cuts or tax increases  needed  to muster  public
resources  for debt servicing  may be  opposed in Congress; tax
administration  may be highly inefficient,  and incapable  of quick
reform;  the  realities  of political  competition,  with the  risks  of
16More specifically,  even  if the  President  and  his economics
teams  wants  to service  the  debt.
12electoral  defeat, may  frustrate  a  government  that attempts  to
service the debts in  full; 17 the austerity  provoked  by  debt
servicing  may lead  to insurrection  and  domestic  unrest. From  the
point of view of  the economics team in the government,  the
situation  typically  looks  much more like  an "inability"  to pay,
rather  than  an "unwillingness"  to  pay.
There is  in fact grima facie evidence for applying the
lessons  of  bankruptcy  to the  case  of the  sovereign  debt overhang.
The  single  biggest  failure  of the  debt  management  process  to date
is the  progressive  decapitalization  of the  debtor  countries,  just
as is predicted  by the analysis  of how creditors,  will behave  in
the absence pf  a  collective  debt reduction  mechanism.  This
decapitalization  is evidenced  anecdotally  by events  such as the
electrical  blackouts  in Buenos  Aires  in early  1989,  which  reflect
not  only  unforseen  disturbances,  but  also  years  of  underinvestment
in energy facilities.  The decapitalization  is more generally
evident  in statistics  showing  the  remarkable  drop-off  in the  rate
of  capital accumulation  in the countries  with debt servicing
problems,  as shown in Table 1.  This decline in investment  is
blocking the  effective recovery and  growth of  the  debtor
countries,  to the  disadvantage  of creditors  as  well  as debtors.
Though  there  are  many factors  in this  decline  in investment
rates,  at least  some  are  importantly  related  to the  debt  overhang.
17For instance,  a  congressional  party may split with the
President  in  voting  for  austerity  measures,  for  fear  of electoral
consequences.  The President  and  a small  set  of cabinet  ministers
may  then be  left virtually isolated in pushing for economic
reforms,  as  has occurred  in  Argentina.
13Table  1
Gross  CaDital  Formation  in Cguntries  with and  without
_-Debt-Servicing  Problems  (fercent  of  GDP'
1980  1981 1982 1983  1984 1985  1986 1987
Countries  with  25.5 24.7 22.6 19.0  18.4 18.6 19.0  18.4
Debt-Servicing
Problems
Countries  without  27.9  27.9 26.9 26.5  26.5 27.8  27.4 27.2
Debt-Servicing
Problems
Source:  IMF  World  Economic  Outloo_k,  October  1988,  Table  A7,  p.66
14Countries  in debt-servicing  difficulties  have lost  access  to new
international  .capital  market  lending even  for  incrementally
profitable  investments  in the private  sector  (and certainly  the
public sector); they have suffered  a  signifi.cant  reduction  of
foreign  direct investment;  and they have lost access, in many
cases, to normal short-term  trade financing.  Importantly,  the
decline  in investment  in the heavily  indebted  countries  exceeds
decline  in net resource  transfers  from abroad  in recent  years,
suggesting  that investment  has declined  not only because  of the
lack of foreign  resources,  but also because  of the more general
disincentives  against  investment  in the debtor  countries  created
by the  debt  crisis  itself.
Though most observers recognize the  seriousness  of  the
decline  in investment  rates,  there  is  a considerable  divergence  in
views  as to  whether  debt  reduction  is  really  a necessary  condition
for a substantial  improvement  in investment  rates,  and whether
debt reduction  could actually  benefit  the creditors  by spurring
enough investment  to raise the eventual  servicing  of the debt.
One school of thought  holds that higher investment  should  be
financed  by a reduced  the  net resource  transfer  out of the  HICs
brought about  mainly  through new  lending instead of  debt
reduction;  a second  school  of thought  holds  that  the  net resource
transfer  should  be cut  mainly  through  debt  reduction.
The  "new  money'  school  of  thought  holds  that  the
inefficiencies  of  the debt overhang  can be kept under control
without  the  need for  a formal  reduction  of the  debt. Defenders  of
15this position  used to argue that the debt crisis  was merely  a
short-term  liquidity  problem, and  the after a  bit of bridge
financing  the  countries  would  soon  return  to the  capital  markets.
Now,  defenders  of this  viewpoint  suggest  that  we don't  really  know
whether  the  problem  is liquidity  or solvency, 18 but that  until  we
find out conclusively  we can nurture  the  debtors  along  with new
loans  and thereby  avoid  the  high costs  of a debt  overhang.1 9 In
essence,  the  debt-rescheduling  process  is  called  upon  to  mimic  the
case  of actual  debt  relief  by providing  enough  "new  money"  so that
the  debtor  pays  no more in actual  cash flow  than  it  would  in the
case of actual  debt reduction,  but does so through  a combination
of larger  debt  repayments  balanced  by new  lending.
2.1.  Why the  "new  money"  approach  will  continue  to fail
In practice,  the rescheduling  process  never  has, and  almost
surely  never  can, come close  to mimicking  the  benefits  of actual
debt reduction. This is for  several  reasons. First,  new  lending
requires  a collective  action  on the  part of creditors  that  is no
longer  achievable  except  on rare occassions  in the case of the
very largest  countries. The process  of negotiating  new money  is
very  costly,  and  inevitably  so,  in  that  it  is  prone  to  breakdowns,
inadequate  levels of financing,  long and costly delays,  high-
18With  solvency considered in  the  expanded sense, of
recognizing  the  government's  limited  political  resources  to  muster
debt  servicing  capacity.
19Bulow and Rogoff (1988)  suggest,  for example,  that the
current  negotiating  process  has  resolved  most  of  the
inefficiencies  in  debt  management.
16stakes  brinksmanship,  and so forth. Second,  even if the  existing
creditors  agree  to refinance  a significant  proportion  of payments
that are due, new creditors  are still  blocked  from  participating
in new lending  on a decentralized  basis,  for  fear  of having  their
new  loans become part of the overall  bad debt.  And third,
refinancing  (rather than debt reduction)  causes a build-up of
future  debt that may adversely  affect  the incentives  of current
investors,  mainly  the  debtor  governments.  Let  us consider  each  of
these  points  in  turn.
First, the rescheduling  process  has all but broken down.
There  are  at least  42 countries  that  have rescheduled  their  debts
with commercial  banks in recent  years. 20 Of these.  only four
countries  were able  to  negotiate  new  money  agreements  in 1987-88:
Argentina  (1987).  Brazil (1988).  Ecuador  (1987).  and Ivory  Coast
(1988). Every  one  of these  agreements  has  come to  naught.  As of
January 1989, the Argentine  agreement  has completely  collapsed,
20  These are listed  in Table III-5  of the World Bank World
Debt Tables. 1988-89  Edition.  The countries,  in alphabetical
order,  are  as  follows:  Argentina,  Bolivia,  Brazil,  Central  African
Republic,  Chile,  Congo,  Costa  Rica,  Cote  d'Ivoire,  Cuba,  Dominican
Republic, Ecuador, Gabon, Gambia, Guyana, Honduras, Jamaica,
Liberia,  Madagascar, Malawi,  Mexico,  Morocco,  Mozambique,
Nicaragua,  Niger, Nigeria, Panama, Peru, Philippines,  Poland,
Romania, Senegal, Sierra  Leone, Somalia,  Sudan, Togo, Turkey,
Uganda, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yugoslavia,  Zaire, Zambia.  One
country,  Turkey,  has reestablished  normal  market  creditworthiness
after falling  into a debt crisis.  One other country,  Colombia,
has  not  rescheduled,  but  does  not  have  normal  market  access  to  new
lending. After  a  prolonged  negotiation,  Colombia  and  the  creditor
banks  agreed  in late  1988  to a new  money  package  of $1.7  billion.
Notably,  to the consternation  of the Colombian  government,  this
new  money package does not even fully refinance amortization
payments  (which  are  about  $2.1  billion),  and therefore  refinances
none  of the  interest  payments  due.
17with Argentina  in arrears  for pore than  9 months;  the Brazilian
agreement  has  collapsed  in  important  part,  with  various  provisions
unilaterally  suspended  by  Brazil and with  the prospects for
drawing the  next  credit tranche very  slim;  the  Ecuadorian
agreement was  never  implemented,  because the barnks  did  not
subscribe  an adequate  amount  of money,  leading  Ecuador  to suspend
the provisional  agreement;  and the  Ivory  Coast  agreement  also  was
not  implemented,  and  the  country  remains  in  deep  arrears.
For  most  of the  other  debtor  countries,  the  absence  of a new
money  agreement  signifies  the  collapse  of adequate  financing.  The
following  countries  were in arrears  on interest  payments  as of
January 1989 (this list is almost surely not comprehensive):
Argentina,  Bolivia,  Costa  Rica,  Cote  D'Ivoire,  Dominican  Republic,
Ecuador,  Guyana, Honduras,  Liberia,  Nicaragua,  Nigeria,  Panama,
Peru,  Sudan,  Zaire,  and Zambia. Many other  countries  are  not in
arrears,  but have been unable  to negotiate  new money  agreements.
For example,  Yugoslavia  renegotiated  its bank debt in 1988 but
received  no new financing  (despite  a presumptive  need for  external
financing  suggested  by a 250  percent  annual  inflation  rates).
This situation  is unlikely  to change,  since  the banks  have
become less willing over time to participate  in these  packages.
The Washington-based  Institute  of International  Finance,  which
lobbies  on behalf  of the banks,  made this point  explicitly  in a
letter  to the IMF last fall,  when it announced  that it would  be
"unable"  to provide  $6-9 billion  of loans  per year.  Since  this
would  reflect  less  than  2 percent  of existing  exposure,  the  banks
18are  announcing  that  they  will  not refinance  even  one-fifth  of the
interest  due from the debtor  countries. Since the  vast  bulk of
any  new  money  will  inevitably  go to  Argentina,  Brazil,  and  Mexico,
there  is essentially  no refinancing  available  for the  smaller  25
to 30  countries  now  in financial  distress. 21
The IIF letter  was not simply a  negotiating  ploy.  Th-e
decline  of actual  agreements  reached  in  1987-88,  and  the  fact  that
afl  have broken down in short order,  is one kind of evidence.
Another  is the  fact  that  the  U.S.  batiks  in  droves  are  now selling
off their Latin  exposure,  as shown in Table 2.  I will stress
below  the important  point  that  the  smaller  banks.  are  divesting  at
a  more  rapid  rate  than  the  larger  banks,  but the  key  point  her.e  is
that  all  banks  are getting  out  of the  term-lending  business,  and
the cavacity  to  put together  realistic  agreements  (which  last for
more  than three  months  at a time)  has  virtually  disappeared.  And
despite the rhetoric even the banks with the most extensive
foreign  operations  are leaving  the  scene:  Bank of  America  will be
sharply  contracting  its  international  operations  in 1989.
The only possibility  for substantial  amounts  of new money
would  be for a major increase  in official  creditor  lending  (for
example,  the  banks  are  now  pressing  hard  for  public  guarantees  of
new  private  bank lending). Such  a shift  of lending  from  the  banks
to the  official  creditors  would  be a  politically  untenable  bailout
21In their new report, "The Way Forward for Middle-Income
Countries",  og.  cit., the  IIF states,  "In  short,  for  many bankds
the benefits  of maintaining  the current  collective  strategy  [of
new money]  have diminished,  while  most  banks'  willingness  to  make
new  loans  to troubled  debtors  has  declined."  (p.16)
19Table  2
Reductions  in  LDC  ExRosure  at  29 Banks  Selected  Among  the  Largest
Total  LDC  Exposure  Exposure  Reductions
in  Millions  June  1987  to
(unless  otherwise  noted)  September  1988
June 87  Sept  88
Citicorp  $14,600  $12,100  $2,500  17%
BankAmerica  10,354  9,000  1,354  13%
Manufacturers  Hanover  9,234  8,688  546  6%
Chase  Manhattan  8,740  7,950  790  9%
Chemical  Banking  5,945  5,900  45  1%
J.P.  Morgan  5,400  4,700  700  13%
Bankers Trust  4,000  4,000  ,  0  0%
First  Chicago  3,120  2,429  691  22%
Continental  Illinois  2,400  2,000  400  17%
Irving  Bank  Corp  1,950  1,890  60  3%
Mellon  1,600  1,386  214  13%
Security  Pacific  2,200  1,260  940  43%
Bank  of Boston  1,400  1,000  400  29%
First  Interstate  1,606  996  610  38%
Wells  Fargo  1,909  760  1,149  60%
Bank  of New  York (a)  544  470  74  14%
Republic  of  New  York  487  E  461 E  26  5%
PNC  Financial  (c)  481  E  291  190  40%
First  Fidelity  (b)  237  177  60  25%
Northern  Trust  (a)  321  149  172  54%
Southeast  Banking  (b)  215  117  98  46%
MNC  Financial  223  107  116  52%
Bank  of New  England  307  106  201  65%
Valley  National  155  62  93  60%
Fleet/Norstar  145  52  93  64%
First  Wisconsin  289  17  272  94%
Norwest  Corp.  (b)  515  16  499  97%
First  Wachovia  212  8 (d)  204  96%
NCNB  Corp.  247  4  243  98%
$78,837  $66,095  $12,742  16%
(a)  Includes  loans  only
(b)  Includes  non-trade-related  credits  only
(c)  Includes  medium-  and  long-term  LDC  loans  only
(d) The exposure  totals  at these  dates  were fully  reserved  against
NOTE:  Exposures  only in  dollars  (and  not in  local  currency)  are included
E - Estimate
20of the  commercial  banks,  if it  were  not combined  with significant
concessions  from the banks themselves. Such new lending  would
almost  surely  run up against  strong  political  opposition  in the
U.S.,  unless  the new official  lending  were visibly  tied to debt
reduction  (e.g.  through  official  guarantees  of exit  bonds). There
was considerable  Congressional  opposition  to the General  Capital
Increase of  the World Bank in 1988 on  the grounds that it
represented  a thinly  veiled  bailout  of the  money-center  banks.
Even  if  "new money" became available to cover interest
payments,  it would not overcome  the inefficiencies  of the debt
overhang. A reduction  of debt  via  bankruptcy  is  helpful  not  only
becauses  it reduces  the  repayments  due  from  debtors  to creditors,
but also  because  it allows  new  creditors  to enter  into  agreements
with the  bankrupt  firm  on a normal  market  basis.  Similarly,  with
a heavily indebted  country,  the overhang  of public  sector  debt
puts a damper on a vast range of financial  relations  between
residents  of the country  and the international  capital  markets.
For example,  most of the  smaller  HICs  have lost access  to normal
trade  financing,  since  banks  fear  that  even  short-term  trade  lines
will be  subject to transfer risk.  While the data are  not
available  to establish  this  point  generally,  it is certa.i.ly  the
case in Bolivia,  Costa  Rica,  Ecuador,  and Peru, and pro'ably  in
most  other  problem  debtor  countries.
The final  reason  that the "new  money"  approach  is bound to
fail is that even if much greater  short-term  cash flow relief
could  be provided  by new money,  and even if the  problem  with new
21creditors  could  be overcome,  the  debt  overhang  would  almost  surely
create  extremely adverse incentive problems for  the  debtor
governments  in regard  to their  decisions  on public  investment  and
economic  reform. Governments  would  continue  to have a hard time
justifying  tough  reform  measures  to the extent  that such reforms
seem designed  to increase  future  debt  servicing  payments  abroad.
As stressed  by Sachs  (1987,1988a,1988b),  such  reform  measures  are
almost  everywhere in  Latin  America caught  in  a  political
stalemate,  except  in those  countries  that rule  by repression  or
that  have  won  a  measure  of effective  debt  relief  (e.g.  Bolivia).
Formal  models  of this incentive  problem  typically  depict  a
government  choosing  between  investing  or consuming  in  the  current
period,  to show that a debt overhang  acts like a tax on future
investment. 22 But the real problem  is more serious  than this.
Even  more pernicious  than  this incentive  effect  is the  effect  of
the debt overhang  on  the electoral  choices in Latin America.
Candidates  in favor  of long-term  reform  in the  present  situation
have little apparent to offer to the public: they promise to
impose  a burden  today  in  order  to  carry  out  the  reforms,  and  then
implicitly  to maintain  the  burden  in the  future  when they  service
the  foreign  debt.  Candidates  with  a shorter-term  message,  of  debt
moratorium and  real  wage  increases in  the  current period,
therefore  have a much more attractive  message  to offer to large
parts  of the  population. The result  is a resurgence  of populism
22See  for  example Sachs  (1986), Corden (1988),  and  the
discussion  in  Krugman  (1988).
22in Argentina,  Brazil, Ecuador,  Mexico, and Peru, that poses a
significant  danger  to the  possibility  of long-term  reform.
The creditor  community  has rarely  shown an appreciation  of
the need for a  compromise  on debt reduction  for the sake of
bolstering  the  moderate  Dolitical  factions  that  are  most likely  to
service  the debt,  All of the short-run  pressures  for reform  by
the  IMF  and  World  Bank  count  for  nothing  if the  moderate  political
forces  are  unable  to  maintain  power  in  Latin  America's
increasingly turbulent political environment.  Actual  debt
reduction  should  be seen  as  an instrument  for  bolstering  reformist
political forces, not only so that they themselves  have the
incentive  to undertake  the right,  policies,  but also  so that they
can  win  elections against candidates that  promise easier
solutions.
3.  The  Ineffectiveness  of "Voluntary  Debt  Reduction"
The  idea  of debt  reduction  has  been  around  for  sev-eral  years,
but the actual  accomplishment  of debt reduction  has  been meagre.
The main channel  for debt reduction  has been debt-equity  swaps,
which  ironically  are the  kind of debt  reduction  that  is typically
harmful to the debtor country.  In fact, despite the enormous
pressure  from the commercial  banks for such programs,  they have
been suspended  in almost  every  country ;hat  has introduced  them,
with the exception  of Chile.  Moreover,  despite the dozens of
commercial  bank reschedulings  since  1982, there  is not a sinzle
case of commercial  bank debt being rescheduled  at sub-market
23interest  rates.  despite  the fact that  manv countries  are almost
universally  acknowledged  to  be financial  "basket  cases"  that  have
no Rossibility  of fully servicing  their  debts on normal  market
terms. 23
In this  section,  I  will stress  that  the  meagre  record  on  debt
reduction is an  intrinsic feature of  the bargaining  process
between the  banks  and  the  debtor countries, as  it  is  now
structured.  Without  a bankruptcy  institution,  and without the
official  creditor community attempting to  design  conerted
agreements  as in a bankruptcy  court,  real debt reduction  will
almost  surely  not  be accomplished  even  with a broadened  "menu  of
options"  that includes  more  debt  reduction  mechanisms.
Debt  reduction schemes should be  measured against the
standard of restored  creditworthiness  of the debtor  country.
Specifically,  the debt reduction  should  be extensive  enough to
accomplish  the  following  goals:  (1)  to  allow  the  debtor  country  to
service  the  external  debt  on the  revised  contractual  basis  without
the need to refinance  interest  paynents  in new  concerted  lending
packages;  (2)  to  allow  the  private  sector  in  the  debtor  country  to
attract  suppliers  credits,  trade  credits,  and  project  finance,  on
a decentralized  basis. If  some  partial  debt  reduction  takes  place
23Some countries  in this category  include  Bolivia,  Sudan,
Nigeria,  Peru.  The  absence of  sub-market interest rate
settlements  is absolutely  astounding  in my view, and  belies  the
commitment  to a truly  case-by-case  approach. For the  real  basket
case  countries,  those  which  have  been  declared  "value  impaired"  by
the  U.S. regulators,  there  is  no possibility  whatsoever  for  a new
money package,  since  such  packages  are  virtually  circumscribed  by
U.S. regulations,  which would force immediate  writedowns  of the
new loans  granted  to these  countries.
24but  fails  to  accomplish these  two  goals,  most  of  the
inefficiencies-discussed  earlier  will  remain  despite  the  effort  of
arranging  the debt reduction. Also in that  case,  as Bulow and
Rogoff  (1988)  have  stressed,  it  is  likely  that  official  guarantees
will  cost a lot  of public  money  with little  benefit  to the  debtor
country.  As with a bankrupt  firm, there is little  sense in a
reorganization  of the  debt  if  the  firm  is  going  to  r.main  in  acute
financial  distress.
Under "voluntary"  arrangements,  d  small  number  of banks can
frustrate  a  comprehensive  settlement  of a country's  debt  overhang.
As shown in Table 3, of the 16 U.S. banks chat held Bolivian
exposure  at the time of the Bolivian  buyback  (and that  did not
otherwise  dispose  of their  debt in  the  secondary  market),  13  banks
sold  out  entirely,  while  the  3  largest  creditors  (Bank  of America,
Citicorp,  and Morgan  Guaranty)  held on to most of their  claims.
Their motivation  for holding on was mainly to avoid setting  a
precendent  for other countries,  but the implication  for Bolivia
are  clear:  these  few  banks,  and  several  like  them  abroad,  have  so
far  frustrated  a full  settlement  of Bolivia's  debt  problem. 24
24There is still an excellent  prospect  for completing  the
debt reduction  in the Bolivian  case,  since  the  official  creditor
community  supports  a complete  solution  to Bolivia's  problems,  and
since a  very few banks are now the bottleneck  to a complete
solution.  In any event, as described in Sachs (1988b), the
Bolivian debt management  process since 1985 (which  includes  a
prolonged  period  of arrears  on commercial  bank loans,  extensive
official  financial  support,  and the 1988  debt  buyback)  has given
Bolivia  crucial  breathing  space  that  has allowed  an economic  and
political  recovery  to  get  underway  in the  country.
25Table  3
U.S. Bank  Participation  in the  Bolivian  Debt  BuXback
-Exposure  Total  Sales
Bank  (in  millions)  Cash  Bonds
Bavik  of America  69.2  10.0
Citibank  50.974  9.315  12.829
Morgan  Guaranty  11.465  0.0
Manufacturers  Hanover  7.984  7.984
Bankers  Trust  7.359  7.359
Wells  Fargo  6.311  6.311
AMEX  Bank  Ltd.  4.55  4.55
First  Penn.  Bank  4.116  r  4.116
Atlantic  International  Bank  3.616  3.616
Chemical  Banking  3.105  3.105
Texas  Commerce  Bank  3.092  0.0
California  First  Bank  2.86  2.86
AmSec  Bank  2.23  2.23
Irving  Trust  1.417  1.417
Shawmut  Bank  0.955  0.955
NCNS (Nat'l  Bank  of N. Carolina)  0.907  0.0
Allied  Bank  Int'l  0.295  0.295
Seattle  - First  National  0.177  0.177
Note:  In the Bolivian  buyback,  banks  could  swap existing  debt for  cash (at
11 percent) or ior investment  bonds (which  can be used for debt-equity
swaps,  and  are  redeemable  in  bolivianos  for  the  boliviano  equivalent  of 16.5
of the face  value  of the  debt. All of the  banks  except  for  Citibank,  Bank
of America,  Morgan  Guaranty,  and Texas  Commerce  Bank, sold or swapped  100
percent  of their  portfolios.
26There  are  several  barriers  to  comprehensive 25 debt  reduction,
even  with more extensive  use of "voluntary"  methods  that are  now
supported  by the  official  creditor  community  (e.g.  buybacks,  exit
bonds, and debt-equity  swaps).  These barriers are: (1) the
inherent  collective-action barrier  to  comprehensive debt
reduction;  (2) the problem of precedents;  (3) the problem of
public  sector  bailouts;  (4)  the  distorted  incentives  of the  large
banks;  (5)  the  structure  of the  bargaining  cycle.
It is  useful  to  examine  each  of these  barriers  in  turn.
3.1  The inherent  collective-action  barrier  of  voluntary  schemes
In a "voluntary"  debt reduction  mechanism,  each creditor  is
free to choose  whether  to participate  or not.  Non-participation
means  that  the  creditor  continues  to  hold the  original  claim,  and
can attempt  to collect  as much as possible  on that  claim.  Thus,
there is a basic arbitrage  condition  which attaches  voluntary
schemes:  participation  in the scheme  must,  on the margin,  be no
worse than holding out, and sticking  with the original  claim.
Thus, in a voluntary  scheme,  the creditor  must compare  the  value
of the existing  claim after the debt reduction  has taken Rlace
with the  value  of th!  alternative  claim  that  is  available  through
participation  in the  debt  reduction  scheme.
25 I  will  use  "comprehensive"  debt  reduction as  debt
reduction  that is sufficient  to obviate  the need for concerted
lending  packages,  and sufficient  to allow for a restoration  of
trade  credits  and  project  financing  for  the  private  sector.
27But now  an obvious  paradox  arises,  which  is  best illustrated
in the  case  of certainty. A full  restoration  of creditworthiness
would imply that all claims  on the  debtor,  including  "old'  debt
which does not participate  in the debt reduction  process,  will
rise in value to its face  value.  The secondary  market  price  of
the old debt will be 100 cents on the dollar after the debt
reduction,  if full  creditworthiness  is indeed  restored. 26 Thus,
under certainty,  there  would  be no motivation  for an individual
creditor, that has  a  small share of  the  overall debt,  to
participate in  a  voluntary scheme if  the  creditor receives
something  less  than  100  percent  of face  value.
The result,  which is proved  formally  by Helpman (1988)  for
example,  is that  voluntary  debt reduction  may be impossible  as a
market equilibrium  even when the creditors  as  a whole would
benefit  from  the  debt  reduction  relative  to the  status  quo. Thus,
the  insistence  that  debt  reduction  be voluntary  actually  hurts
the creditors  as a whole.  It probably  helps,  however,  a small
part  of the  creditor  group  (the  large  money-center  banks),  a point
that  we stress  below.
The same  point  can  also  be  made from  the  point  of  view  of the
international  institutions,  as  has  been  done  by Dooley  (1987). It
may be prohibitively  costly  to use official  money for a buyback,
or for other forms  of credit  enhancement,  in a purely  voluntary
debt  reduction  arrangement, since  the  cost  of  restoring
26Note,  importantly,  that  this  illustration  is  considering  the
case of certainty  only;  with  uncertainty,  market  creditworthiness
may  be consistent  with  a discount  on the  face  value  of the  debt.
28creditworthiness  becomes  virtually  the entire  face value of the
debt in the case that the individual  banks can freely decide
whether  to  opt in  or opt  out.
The  fundamental  distortion of  voluntary debt  reduction
schemes is recognized  by the banks, even though they fail to
understand  its analytical  importance,  or its  implications  for  the
failure  of the  voluntary  approach. The IlF  has recently  written
(op. cit., p. 23), that "the cost (of debt reduction]  is the
discount  incurred  in  exchanging  old  assets  for  new  assets,  but the
benefits  accrue  to all  creditors  and  to the  debtor  country  because
its  external  debt servicing  costs  are reduced. Thus,  particular
creditors  benefit if other creditors  can be induced  to reduce
their  claims." This  externality  is  praised  by the  IIF  as an  added
benefit  of voluntary  debt reduction,  rather  than  as the  profound
barrier  to  efficient  debt  reduction  that  it is in  fact.
The  key  to efficient debt reduction is  to require the
creditors  to exercise  their  o\xn  self  interest  by participation  in
a  concerted  debt reduction  scheme.  The appropriate  test for a
concerted  debt reduction  scheme  is  whether  the  creditors  are  made
better  off  than  in the  status  quo.  By this  test,  the  banks  should
compare  the secondary  market  price of the debt before the debt
reduction  with the  value  of the  asset  that they  would  receive  in
the  concerted  debt  reduction  scheme.
3.2 The  problem  of precedent
Among  the  banks  and  the  U.S.  Treasury,  almost  the  entire  debt
29process  is conceived  of in terms  of no more than  five  countries:
Argentina,  Brazil,  Mexico,  the  Philippines,  and  Venezuela. While
there are  at  least 42  countries that have rescheduled  their
commercial  bank debts in recent years, the five main debtors
account  for about  80 percent  of the exposure  of the  nine money-
center  U.S. banks to all  42 countries. The top  three  countries
(Argentina,  Brazil,  and  Mexico)  alone  count  for  64 percent  of the
total exposure  of the money-center  banks to the problem LDCs.
Importantly,  however,  from a humanitarian  and geopolitical  point
of view, the five countries  count for only 40 percent  of the
population  of the  entire  group. 27 In the  debt  ma.nagement  process,
there is little  serious  attempt  to address  the problems  of the
smaller  debtor  countries  for fear of setting  adverse  precedents
for the larger  countries. There is also  no new money  for these
countries.  The arguments  that the banks use for opposing  debt
relief  (e.g.  that they  are in the countries  for  the  "long  haul";
that the countries  can successfully  service  their debts in the
long term; that the countries  will want to return  to commercial
bank lending  in the  near term),  manifestly  do not apply  for  many
if not most of the smaller  debtor  countries. Countries  such as
Bolivia, Dominican  Republic, Ecuador,  and Peru, among others,
cannot  pay their  bills;  are in  no condition  to expect  a return  to
27In geopolitical  terms,  it  should  be remembered  that  even a
country of  3 million people,  Nicaragua,  with an insignificant
proportion  of the foreign  debt,  virtually  dominated  U.S. foreign
policy  attention  in  Latin  America  in  recent  years. And  of course,
Nicaragua's  political  crisis  in the 1980s  was crucially  tied to
the  economic  crisis  in the  country  in  the  1970s.
30commercial  bank lending  for  a great  many  years;  and  do not  expect
a  continuing,  presence of  the  money-center  banks  in  their
countries.  And  yet  for  these  countries,  as much  as for  Argentina,
Brazil,  and  Mexico,  comprehensive  debt  reduction  has  been off the
agenda.
The reason is not hard to decipher:  it may be found in
Cartoon  No. 1 on the  next page.  The small  debtor  countries  have
so little  debt that there  is almost  nothing  to gain for the  big
banks in reaching  a more efficient  solution  for them,  while the
risk  of a  precedent  might  be very  damaging. The  smaller  countries
are  truly  worth  more  as an example.
Thus, in the case of Bolivia,  the money-center  banks have
held  on to their  claims,  even  as all  of the  rest  of the  U.S.  banks
have abandoned  theirs.  There is still a  good chance fcr a
comprehensive  settlement  in  Bolivia  (as  is  supposed  in the  IMF  and
World  Bank  programs  for  the  country,  and  has  been  committed  by key
banks in  the  steering committee),  but  only after overcoming
significant  money-center bank  resistance to  the  risk  of  a
precedent.  Bolivia's  needs  at this  point  have relatively  little
to do with the strategy  of the  big banks  vis-a-vis  the  Bolivian
debt.
3.3  The  expectation  of  public  sector  bailouts
The third  major reason  why comprehensive  debt reduction  is
unlikely  is  the  continuing  signal  from  the  official  community  that
public  money  will  come  to  the  rescue  of  the  faltering
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32renegotiation  process.  The banks and the debtor  countries  are
certainly  not  the  only  players  in  the  debt-renegotiation  game.
The official  creditor  community  has  a major  stake  in the  process,
one  that  is  well  understood  by the  largest  commercial  banks.
The money-center  banks are essentially  in the position  of
Stackelberg  leaders  vis-a-vis  the  official  lenders  (including  the
Treasuries  of the  G-7 countries,  the  IMF,  the  World  Bank,  and  the
multilateral  development  banks).  To the extent  that the banks
limit  new lending  or debt reduction,  they  know that the  official
community  will  make  up at least  part  of the  difference  in  official
lending  to the debtor  countries. This is because the official
creditors  have an important  stake in maintaining  political  and
economic  stability  in the  debtor  countries,  and thus  are willing
to  put  money  into  the  process  if  the  banks  do  not.
This infusion  of  Rublic  money  acts  as a tax  on debt  reduction
schemes.  It is easy to show that if the official  creditors
decrease  their  contributions  to a debtor  country  for  each dollar
increase  of debt relief  from the private  banks,  the banks will
have the  incentive  to  underprovide  debt  reduction,  at the  expense
of  both  the  official  creditors  and  the  debtor  country.
This process  is increasingly  evident.  In Sachs (1988b),  it
is shown  that the official  creditors  have systematically  put net
resources  into the  major  debtor  countries  while  at the same time
the commercial  banks have systematically  removed  net resources.
In  the  Paris  Club,  the  official  bilateral  creditors  have  virtually
stopped  collecting  money: almost  all countries  are now able to
33negotiate  rescheduling  agreements  in the Paris  Club in which  100
percent  of interest  and  principal  is  postponed  for  several  years.
The terms  are  substantially  more  favorable  than  those  given  by the
commercial  banks,  despite  the  debtor's  commitment  under  the terms
of the Paris Club to negotiate  terms  with other creditors  with
terms  at least  as concessional  as the terms  offered  by the  Paris
Club  creditors.
The  process  of substituting  official  finance  for  bank finance
has  become more explicit over time.  In recent months, for
example, the U.S. Treasury  has engineered  a large  bailout for
Mexico,  in which  a large  "bridge"  loan  was  made ($3.5  billion)  to
future  World  Bank and IMF lending  even though  loan  programs  from
those institutions  had not been negotiated.  The money was to
guarantee a  smooth transition  period in which commercial  bank
interest  payments  would  not be interrupted.  Mora generally,  the
World  Bank  and  the  Government  of Japan  (especially  via the  Export-
Import  Bank) are widely seen to be acting  as "lenders  of last
resort"  to fill in the  financial  needs  of large  debtor  countries
that  are  not  met in  new  money  packages. 28 Similar  Treasury  loans
are now under  consideration  for  Argentina,  Brazil,  and  Venezuela.
The General Capital Increase  of the World Bank, the recycling
program  of  the  Japanese  Government, and  anticipated quota
increases  for  the  International Monetary  Fund  and  the
InterAmerican  Development  Bank,  are all  viewed  by the  commercial
28This  has  become  explicit  in  country  negotiations,  where  the
banks  resist  new money  because  they insist  the  financing  gap  can
be made  up  with  contributions  from  Japan  and  other  creditors.
34banks  as important  sources  of  money  that  will  substitute  for  fresh
bank  lending  in  the  coming  years. 29
3.4 The  distorted  incentives  of the  large  banks
Despite  all of the biases  against  debt reduction  (e.g.  the
advantages  of waiting  for  others  to give  relief;  the  problems  of
precedent;  the prospects  of an official  bailout),  most  banks are
now prepared  to accept  significant  losses  on the debt in return
for ridding  themselves  of the  problem. This is evidenced  by the
fact that the regional.U.S.  banks are now divesting  of their
entire  LDC  debt  portfolios  on the  secondary  market.at  a  remarkable
rate,  with losses  reaching  50-60  percent  of the  face  value  of the
portfolios. It is a few  money  center  banks,  not the  vast  bulk of
small  and  medium  size  U.S.  banks,  that  are  resisting  comprehensive
writedowns  of their  portfolios. Note in Table  2 that  while  most
U.S.  banks  are  reducing  their  exposure,  the  non-money  center  banks
are  reducing  their  exposure  at a  much faster  rate.
It is important  to analyze  why the large banks are less
willing to sell off their  portfolios,  since that also helps to
29The IIF  was quite  explicit  about  this  point in its  public
letter  to the  IMF  and  World  Bank  last  fall.  The  letter  said  that
the  demand  for  bank  financing "exceeds the  capacity and
willingness  of  banks to  supply it", and  continued with the
statement  that:
The World Bank will have to accept  a larger  share of the
overall  lending  risk  by increasing  its  own  disbursements,  by
offering  banks  better  cofinancing  opportunities  and  by taking
the  initiative to  introduce other  financing techniques,
including  limited  interest  payment  guarantees.
See the report "Banks 'unable'  to meet loan demands from Third
World",  Financial  Times  of  London,  p. 1,  October  1988.
35explain  why the  large  banks  have so  vigorously  resisted  concerted
debt  reduction  arrangements.  The  large  banks  typically  argue  that
they should  not be expected  to accept  the losses  that  are  being
accepted  by the smaller  banks, since the big banks unlike the
small banks intend  to remain in these countries  for the "long
haul".  In  other words, since the large banks are going to
maintain  business  in  Latin  America,  they  should  not  be expected  to
accept losses on  their existing  debt; the smaller  banks are
selling  off their  portfolios  because  they  are indeed  getting  out
of Latin  America  entirely.
This explanation  actually makes little sense cn  closer
inspection. Citicorp  could  remain  in Mexico  for the "long  haul"
even  if it  agreed  to  cut  interest  rates  on existing  sovereign  debt
Mexican  to sub-market  rates! Indeed,  in  normal  banking  practices.
it  would  be the  bank  with the  long-term  relationship  with  a client
which  would  be expected  to grant  the  concessiouis  to the  client  in
a  case of  financial  distress.  In Japan, for example, it is
precisely the  "main bank" (i.e. the bank with the long-term
relationship,  and  largest exposure,  with the client) that is
called  upon to grant  sub-market  interest  rates  in  order  to  nurse  a
firm  back into  profitability  in  the  case  of financial  distress.
The reascns  for the large  banks'  greater  resistance  to debt
writedowns  has  little  to  do, in  fact,  with their  alleged  long-term
commitment  to the debtor  countries. 30 It has to do with three
30The  extent of  this  long-term commitment is  also not
something  to take  at face  value. Most  banks,  even  large  ones,  are
simply  getting out of the sovereign  loan business,  and out of
36other factors  that should  be deemed  highly  distortionary  to the
process  of debt reduction. First,  the large  banks  are resistant
to writedowns  because of the greater  LDC exposure  relative  to
capital. As we shall  see,  the  higher  exposure  can cause  banks  to
resist debt reduction  even when the debt reduction  is highly
efficient  in the sense  of raising  the expected  present  value of
future  debt  repayments.
Second,  the large  banks  have superior  access  to debt-equity
swaps than do the small banks.  In general,  these debt-equity
swaps offer a less costly  way of divesting  debt than does the
secondary market.  Thus,  the big banks resist comprehensive
agreements  in order to maintain  their options  to pursue debt-
equity  swaps. Unfortunately,  from  the  point  of  view  of the  debtor
country,  the  debt-equity  swaps  tend  to  be highly  deleterious.
Third,  the large  banks recognize  that  by slowing  their  own
debt  reduction  process,  they  also  gain  by  having  the  smaller  banks
"cash in", and accept losses  via exit bonds, secondary  market
sales,  and so forth.  Since  any creditor  is made better  off if
another creditor voluntarily  makes a concession  to the debtor
(since  the remaining  debt increases  in value),  the large  banks
have an added  incentive  to let  the  small  banks  get out  at a large
loss,  while the big banks postpone  any significant  concessions.
This is just another  reflection  of the  collective  action  problem
Latin  America  entirely. Citicorp  is nearly  alone in staying  in
Latin  America  in a significant  way, but there  is simply  no sense
to the idea that this bank alone should  be exempt  from sharing
losses  in a debt reduction  agreement  simply  because  it  has  highly
profitable  local  operations  in  Latin  America.
37demonstrated  at the  beginning  of this  section.
Let  us look  at these  three  factors  in  a  bit  more  detail.
3.4.1. Exposure  ratios  and  the  incentive  to  accept  debt  reduction
The money-center  banks are more heavily exposed than the
smaller  banks in the  U.S.  At the  end of 1987,  the  money-center
bank LDC exposure  to the  42 troubled  debtor  countries  was $56.1
billion,  or 109 percent  of capital. 31 For  the rest  of the  U.S.
banks,  the exposure  was $27.3  billion,  or 35 percent  of capital.
High exposure  Rer se can  be an important  barrier  to acceptance  of
debt  reduction.
The key point is that regulatory  oversight  of the  banks is
based  on the  book  values,  not  market  values,  of the  banks'  assets
and  liabilities.  This means that heavily exposed  banks may
sometimes have  the  incentive  to  avoid book  losses on  their
portfolio  even if they represent  market gains.  A bank with a
large  exposure  of LDC  debt  relative  to  bank capital  might  satisfy
capital-adequacy  requirements  when measured  at book values,  but
fail  to  satisfy  them  when  measured  at  market  value. In  this  case,
the  bank  might  turn  down  participation  in  a debt  reduction  scheme,
even if it raises  the  market  value  of the  LDC  exposure,  if  at the
same time it causes  a book loss  on the  bank's  claims  that  pushes
the bank out of compliance  with the regulatory  guidelines  on
31Calculations  based on  "Country  Exposure  Lending Survey:
December  1987",  of the  Federal  Financial  Institutions  Examination
Council,  April 22, 1988.  By the  end of 1988.  the  capital  ratios
have  come  down  to  well  below  100  percent  of  bank  capital.
38capital  adequacy. 32
This kind of distortion  arises  because  of faulty  accounting
procedures. In the  U.S., the  banks  are  not required  to mark-to-
market  the  valuation  of LDC claims,  so that the  vast  bulk  of the
claims  is  kept on the  books  at 100  percent  of face  value,  despite
a secondary  market  value of around  40 percent  of face value. 33
2 Consider  the following  example.  A bank has total  book
assets of  $1  billion, equity of  $40  million, and  deposit
liabilities  of $960 million,  thus meeting  the requirement  of an
equity-to-assets  ratio  of 4 percent. Of the  $1 billion,  suppose
that the LDC exposure  is $30  million  in book (i.e.  face)  value,
but with a market  value  of $10  million. The  banks  other  assets
are perfectly  secure, with a  market and book value of  $970
million.  The book value of the bank is $40 million,  and the
market  value of the bank is $20  million  ($10m  +  $970m  - $960m).
Now,  suppose  that  a comprehensive  debt  reduction  scheme  comes  into
place,  that  reduces  the  face  value  of the  debt  to  $15  million,  and
raises its market  value to $15 million.  If the bank accepts
participation  in the scheme,  its book value would fall to $25
million,  and the bank would sink below the 4 percent  ratio on
equity-to-assets.  This  would  limit  the  regulatory  independence  of
the  bank (perhaps  restricting  its  dividend  issue;  perhaps  calling
for  intervention  in  bank  management by  the  regulatory
authorities). It is possible  that the  market  value  of the  bank
would fall because  of the resulting  regulatory  intervention  (in
which case the bank management  should  reject  the debt reduction
deal  on  behalf  of the  shareholders).  It is  also  possible  that  the
market  value of the bank would rise because  of the increase  in
value  of the  LDC  debt,  but that  the  management  would  still  reject
the deal (contrary  to the interests  of the  shareholders),  because
the resulting  regulatory  restrictions  would  hurt management  even
though  it would  not hurt the shareholders. In the latter  case,
the  failure  to enter  into  the  debt  reduction  program  would  reflect
a problem of accounting  distortions  combined  with an "agency"
problem  in  firm  management.
33The  banks  are  required  to  write  down  the  value  of  the  claims
only  in  the  case  that  the  regulatory  authorities,  specifically  the
ICERC (Interagency  Country  Exposure  Review Committee),  declares
that a country's  assets  are "value  impaired",  in which case the
banks  must  set  up an  ATRR (allocated  Transfer  Risk  Reserve),  which
effectively  forces  a writedown  of the value of the debt.  The
ICERC  has  studiously  avoided  any  writedowns  for  the  major  debtors,
however,  so that  the  ATRR is only required  in  a few  cases  of very
small  countries  (including Bolivia,  Costa  Rica,  Ecuador,
39Banks are willing to absorb  some losses  on their  LDC claims  in
order  to  clean  up their  portfolios,  but  only  if  such  losses  do  not
jeopardize  the  bank's  plans  for  meeting  the  guidelines  on capital
adequacy,  which  are  based  purely  on  book  values.
Thus, if we examine  which  banks  have actually  reduced  their
LDC  portfolios  the  most (e.g.  via sales  in the  secondary  market),
there  is a  very strong  negative  correlation  between  the  exposure-
to-equity  ratio  and  the  percentage  decline  in  exposure  in  the  past
year.  Using  the  data from  Table  3,  we find  that  on an  unweighted
average  the  nine  money  center  banks  have  reduced  their  exposure  by
10.9  percent,  while  the 20 banks  with less  exposure  have reduced
their  exposure  by an  unweighted  average  of  49.8  percent. 34
3.4.2. Large  banks  and  debt-equity  swaps
There  are,  moreover,  several  ways  to  reduce  the  LDC  exposure,
including  participation  in a comprehensive  debt reduction  scheme
(e.g. the Bolivian  buyback),  sales directly  into the secondary
market, and participation  in a  debt-equity  swap program.  The
latter  offers  banks the least  expensive  way to divest  their  LDC
debt, since debt-equity  swaps generally  allow the creditor  to
avoid  the full  market  loss implicit  in the  secondary  market  (the
discount  is  shared  between  the  debtor  and  the  creditor).  However,
Nicaragua,  Peru,  Sudan).
34The  nine  money  center  banks  are:  Bank  of  America.  Citibank,
Chase Manhattan Bank, Manufacturers  Hanover,  Morgan  Guarantee,
Chemical  Bank,  Continental  Illinois,  Bankers  Trust,  And the  First
National  Bank  of  Chicago.
40effective  participation  in debt-equity  swap programs  generally
requires  a close  working  knowledge  of the  local  economy  that can
be gained  only  through  extensive  operations  in  the  country. Thus,
the largest  banks,  with local  branch  networks,  are best able to
use  the  debt-equity  swap  programs  to their  advantage.35
The  large banks, and  especially  Citicorp, have blocked
comprehensive  debt reduction  arrangements  in tne  past year (e.g.
in Bolivia, Brazil, and Costa Rica), in order to press for
expanded  debt-equity  swap  programs. This  is  perfectly  justifiable
as a corporate  strategy,  but  is highly distortionary  from the
point  of  view  of a settlement  on the  debt  issue. The  main  problem
is that  the  debt-equity  swaps  by themselves  are  generally  harmful
to  the  countries undertaking them,  since  they  imply  an
acceleration  of debt  reRayments  rather  than  an  easing  of the  debt-
service  burden. 36 There  are only limited  circumstances  in which
35Extensive  evidence  from  the  income  statements  of the  money-
center and  regional banks  suggests that  the  largest banks
(especially  Citicorp)  have  been  able  to divest  their  LDC  assets  at
a  lower percentage loss than have  the regional U.S. banks.
Citicorp's  stated  losses  in the  past  year  have  averaged  between  20
and 25 percent  of the reduction  in LDC exposure,  while for the
superregionals,  the loss  has been on the order  of 50 percent  of
the  reduction  in  exposure. These  data  are from  Salomon  Brothers,
"Citicorp  --  Developing  Country  Debt  Reduction  Is  Ahead  of
Schedule",  October 20, 1988;  and Keefe,  Bruyette  & Woods, Inc.,
'In the Southeast,  'LDC'  Stands  for 'Less  Dire Consequences",
January  1989.
36In a debt-equity  program,  the debtor  country  repurchases
the  debt, usually  at somewhere  between  the face  value price and
the secondary  market  price.  Thus, instead  of paying  simply  the
interest  on the  debt (net  of new  lending),  say  a rate  of 5  percent
of exposure, the debtor government  pays 70-80 percent of the
exposure  in order  to repurchase  the  entire  debt.  This repurchase
causes a  worsening of  the budgetary situation, and  thereby
contributes  to inflation.  Even if the  monetary  increase  of the
41debt-equity  swaps may make economic  sense: for private-sector
debt,  and in the  case  of privatisation  of public  enterprises  (for
which  there  are  no inflationary  consequences).
Not surprisingly,  the  largest  banks  have  pushed  relentlessly
for these programs,  while the debtor  countries  have typically
restricted  or  cancelled them soon after they have come into
operation.  In the Brazil rescheduling  agreement  of September
1988,  the Brazilian  government  committed  itself  to a debt-equity
swap  program  in  which  the  debt  would  be repurchased  at face  value,
so that Brazil  would  not even  benefit  in the  market  discount  via
the program! Mercifully,  the  Brazilian  government  suspended  this
part  of the  agreement  in  January  1989.  The  amazing  thing  is  that
the official  community,  which  should  know  better,  has  not opposed
this  kind  of mechanism  despite  the  harm  to the  debtor  countries. 37
A second  problem  with the debt-equity  swaps is that,  given
their  attraction  to Citicorp  and a few other  banks,  these  large
banks  have frustrated  more comprehensive  arrangements  (e.g.  sub-
market interest rates), for  fear of  jeopardizing  the debtor
countries' aquiescence in  the  debt-equity  programs.  Thus,
repurchase  is sterilized,  the result is still likely to be a
significant  rise  in the  debt-service  burden  of the  government  (for
an illustration  with relation  to Brazil,  see Sachs 1989a). The
repurchase terms are also generally far worse than a  direct
buyback  on the  secondary  market.  In Chile,  for example,  Larrain
(1988)  has shown that the Chilean  government  has captured  one
third  or less of the discount  on the secondary  market,  with the
rest  going  to traders,  foreign  firms,  participating  banks,  etc.!
37The Fed, for  example,  has gone  out  of its  way to encourage
debt-equity  swaps,  by amending  Regulation  K, for example,  which
governs  the extent  of equity  participation  that is allowed  for a
U.S.  bank in  an foreign  firm.
42comprehensive  agreements  have  been  held  hostage  to  a form  of debt
reduction  that is itself  harmful  to the interests  of the debtor
countries.
It is important  to  mention  one  further  distortion  which  leads
debtor  countries  into accepting  these  swap programs  despite  the
highly  adverse  macroeconomic  consequences. As stressed  by Luiz
Carlos  Bresser  Pereira,  the  former  Finance  Minister  of Brazil,  who
faced enormous internal  political  pressures  to implement  such
programs:
The debt is a chance  for speculation  and profit. . .Formal
and  informal  (thrctigh  the parallel exchange  rate market)
debt-equity conversions make  possible huge  gains  from
speculation  by some. The  discount  in  the  secondary  market  is
shared  by a number  of people  - bankers,  brokers,  investors,
lawyers  - and  these  people  know  that,  if  a  global
securitization  scheme  is  adopted, they  will  lose  this
extraordinary  source  of gains.
Actually  it is possible  to take  two  opposite  views  about  the
debt-equity  conversions.  You  can think that this is a
positive  way  of gradually  reducing  the  debt,  or  you  can think
that this is a form of coopting  the elites  of the debtor
countries,  making  their  interests  common  to the interests  of
the  major  creditor  banks.  I  am  today  firmly  convinced  that
the  second  alternative  is  the  correct  one. These  debt-equity
swaps  are  based  on the  discount  in  the  secondary  market,  that
is, in the misery of many in the debtor  countries  whose
incapacity  to  pay  is so  portrayed,  but the  one  who  make  large
profits from these  conversions  are a small,  but influential
minority  in the  debtor  countries. 38
3.4.3. The  Large  Banks'  Incentive  to  Wait
The big banks have several  fundamental  reasons  to avoid a
comprehensive  solution  at this  moment,  mainly  their  heavy  exposure
38Luiz  Carlos  Bresser  Pereira,  "Solving  the  Debt  Crisis:
Debt Relief  and Adjustment",  Testimony  presented  tefore  the
Committee  on Banking,  Finance  and  Urban  Affairs  of the  U.S.
House  of  Representatives,"  January  5, 1989.
43relative  to equity,  their  expectation  of official  bailouts,  and
their preference for  debt-equity  swap programs.  These  two
fundamental  factors lead to  a  third, induced  motivation  for
waiting.  The smaller  banks are now cutting their losses and
getting  out in  separate  side  deals  (e.g.  buybacks  and  exit  bonds).
The money-center  banks  know  that  bv waiting,  they  reap  advantages
from  the  concessions  of the  smaller  banks. John  Reed,  Chairman  of
Citicorp,  was  quite  explicit  on this  point  in  a recent  speech:
What is  happening  right  now is  that  some  banks,  like  our  own,
are converting  debt into long-term  investments  [i.e.  debt-
equity  swaps].  At the same time,  some smaller  banks that
have  very  different  interests  are  selling  out  at  prices  that,
frankly,  are  guite  convenient  to those  of us.  who  are  going  to
stay in for the lonE haul  and quite convenient  for the
countries.  (emphasis  added).'9
The waiting game imposes  costs  on the creditors  as a whole (by
allowing a  continuing economic deterioration  in  the  debtor
countries),  but these  costs  are  borne by the smaller  banks (who
sell their  debts  at exceptionally  discounted  prices),  not  by the
larger banks  which  impose the  obstacles to  concerted debt
reduction.
3.5. The Problem  of the  Negotiating  Cycle
Despite  all  of the  resistance  to comprehensive  debt  reduction
on the part of the creditors,  it still  might be asked why the
debtor  countries  do not  have the  bargaining  power  to  achieve  more
39See  John  S.  Reed,  "Opportunities  for  the  New
Administration",  remarks at  the  National Foreign Trade
Council,  New York,  New York (October  18, 1988)  and the Los
Angeles World  Affairs Council, Los  Angeles, California
(October  27,  1988).
44comprehensive  relief. The answer,  it seems,  lies importantly  in
the  nature  of the  bargaining  process. To put the  matter  simply,
the countries  have two objectives:  (1) to remain  on good terms
with  the  official  community,  as a  matter  of foreign  policy  as  will
as financial  policy;  and (2)  to reach  better  agreements  with the
creditor  banks.  As the  negotiating  process  is actually  carried
out, however,  it is virtually  impossible  to attempt  the latter,
without  threatening  the  former.
The official  community  (i.e.  the  U.S.  Treasury,  the  IMF,  and
the World Bank), expects  debtor  countries  to reach negotiated
agreements  with the banks as a precondition  for good official
relations.  When  Brazil  went into  moratorium  in 1987,  for  example,
it was the  withdrawal  of official  financial  support  (e.g.  export
credits  from the official  agencies)  that proved  to do the most
harm to Brazil's  negotiating  position. Similarly,  the  IMF  almost
always requires  that the country reach an agreement  with the
commercial  banks (at least  in principle)  before  it will sign an
IMF Standby.  In turn, the IMF agreement  is necessary  for the
country  to  reschedule  its  bilateral  debts  in  the  Paris  Club,  which
is in turn necessary for the country to arrange new  export
financing from  the  export credit agencies of  the  creditor
governments. The result  is that the countries  are pressed  iV.0o
signing  commercial  bank agreements,  not mainly  because  of their
bargaining  weakness  vis-a-vis  the  banks,  but because  an agreement
with the  banks  has been made the  sine  gua  Sn  of good  relations
with  the  creditor  governments.
45The only cases  of real  progress  towards  debt  reduction  (the
Bolivian  buyback  in  1988,  and  Costa  Rica,  with  a  buyback  likely  in
1989) have occurred when the official creditor  community  has
allowed the debtor  country to maintain  good official  relations
(e.g.  to  have IMF  programs)  during  a period  in  which  the  countries
were in prolonged  arrears  to the  commercial  banks.  The implicit
official sanction  of the arrears  both enabled  the country to
persist  in long-term  negotiations  with the  banks,  and  also  sent  a
signal  to the  barks that  the  debts  were not  going  to  be defended
by the  official  community  to the  last  penny  of interest.
4.  Towards  Efficient  Debt  Reduction
The  voluntary approach, at  least as  now  conceived, is
unlikely to  succeed in  its central purpose: to  restore the
creditworthiness  of the debtor  countries  in order  that they may
achieve  productive efficiency.  Debt  reduction should  be
comprehensive  to  achieve  this  goal,  but  we have seen  that  several
important  barriers  block  a comprehensive  settlement  on  a voluntary
basis:  the inevitable  tendency  of holdouts  to wait for  others  to
grant relief; the problem of precedents;  the expectation  of
official  bailouts;  and the distorted  incentives  of the largest
banks.
These  problems  can  be overcome,  but only  with a resolute  set
of actions  by the  official  creditor  community.  The  key  point  that
the official community  should recognize is that a  real debt
settlement  requires  the  concerted  participation  of the  banks. To
46the extent  that  there  remains  a "menu  of options"  for  the  banks,
this menu should  only include  alternative  ways of accomplishing
debt  reduction. In other  words,  banks  should  not  have the  luxury
of opting  out of the debt reduction  process  entirely,  for that
frustrates  the  whole  process.
The simplest  way to  achieve  a  comprehensive  reduction  of  debt
is through  a reduction  of interest  rates  to sub-market  levels  on
the existing debt.  This mechanism is nearly ideal: it  is
administratively  straightforward  (the  contracts  merely  have to  be
rewritten  to include  interest  rates  of, say, a fixed  4 percent,
rather thau LIBOR plus  13/16); it  is  comprehensive;  it  is
equitable in its  impact across banks; it avoids the adverse
consequences  of  debt-equity  swaps;  it is  a standard  mechanism  for
debt  workouts  in  the  domestic  context;  and  it  may  even  obviate  the
need  for  large,  immediate  writedowns  of capital  under  U.S.  banking
regulations. 40 Furthermore,  it is easy tu  ambine  interest  rate
relief  with credit  enhancement,  since  the  reduced  interest  rates
can  be guaranteed  by the  official  creditors,  e.g. the  World  Bank,
as part  of the  restructuring  process.
Achieving  a  comprehensive  debt reduction  for a particular
debtor country  will require  several steps on the part of the
official  creditor  community  (especially  the  IMF  and  World  Bank):
1. An explicit  recognition  by the  IMF  and  World  Bank  that
the  debt  burden  of the  country  should  be permanently  reduced
(conditional  on the commitment  of the debtor country to
40 Under  FASB 15,  a debt  restructuring  which  preserves  principal,
but  which  reduces  interest  rates,  does not in general  require  a
capital  writedown.
47pursue  appropriate  macroeconomic  policies);
2.  An official  policy  that the  banks  should  share  equally
in the debt reduction. A "menu  of options"  may still  be
used  in  recognition of  regulatory differences facing
different  banks,  but in economic  terms,  all banks slhould
participate  equally  in the  debt  reduction  mechanism. 4
3.  An  official  policy against debt-equity  swaps as a
significant  component  in debt reduction,  except for the
handling  of  private  sector  debt  or the  case  of  privatisation
of a  public-sector  firm.
4.  The design  of official  lending  programs  (e.g.  standby
programs  and structural  adjustment  lending)  based on debt-
servicing  targets  that  take  into  account  the  necessary  debt
reduction.42
5.  An official  policy  that  IMF  and  World  Bank  programs  can
go  forward despite arrears to  the commercial  banks in
circumstances  in which the IMF determines  that the debt
should be reduced,  but in which the bankes  have not yet
agreed  to a comprehensive  debt  reduction  mechanism.
6.  Regulatory  support  for  debt  reduction,  with regu.lators
requiring  writedowns  of debt to market  values for those
countries for  which  debt  reduction packages are  not
concluded. At the  same  time,  a stretching  out  of  writedowns
in  the  cases  that  comprehensive  debt  agreements  are  reached.
7.  The use of official  money to "enhance"  the interest
stream of debt for cases in which the countries  and the
commercial banks  have  agreed to  a  comprehensive  debt
reduction  scheme.  The official  institutions  can provide
partial or complete  interest  payment  guarantees,  depending
on the  precise  economic  circumstances  of  the  debtor  country,
41 As an example,  some  banks  might  prefer  to take  debt
reduction  by a cut in principal,  while  others  would  prefer
to maintain  principal  while  accepting  a sub-market  interest
rate level.  These  differences  should  be accomodated  in a
menu of options,  but all  banks  should  be required  to choose
among  the menu.  New money,  or longer  maturities  and  grace
periods,  definitely  should  not  be equated  to debt  reduction
in the  menu.
42In other  words,  if a country  has a huge overhang  of
debt,  the  IMF  and  World  Bank  programs  for  the  country  should
be designed  on the  assumption  that  the  debt  will  eventually
be reduced  in  negotiations  between  the  debtor  and  the  banks.
48and the nature  of the debt reduction  agreed to with the
comercial banks.
8.  Strict conditionality  on  official lending for all
countries  negotiating  debt reduction  programs,  and for all
countries  seeking  programs  in the face of commercial  bank
arrears.
9.  A policy  that  sustained  interest  arrearages  on payments
after  debt reduction  has taken  place  should  trigger  cross-
default  provisions  with other IMF and World  Bank lending.
This is especially  important  in cases in which there  are
official  guarantees  of the  interest  payments  that  have been
missed.
10.  An  official  policy of support for debt reduction
through  the  mechanism  of sub-market  iterest  rates,  as the
simplest, fairest, and administratively  easiest form of
comprehensive  debt  reduction.
To understand  the import  of these  principles,  it is useful to
focus  on a concrete  case.  For  that,  I will Lhoose  the  pending
negotiations  with  Ecuador. 43
4.1. Targetting  debt  reduction:  the  case  of Ecuador
Ecuador  offers  an important  case  for  debt  reduction,  and  an
important  illustration  of the  crucial  choices  facing  the  official
creditor  community in guiding  the process  of debt reduction.
Since 1981,  per capita income  in Ecuador  has declined  by more
than 8 percent. Urban  unemployment  has reached  13 percent,  and
the real minimum  wage has fallen  by 46.4 percent  since 1980.
Ecuador's  terms of trade has deteriorated  by 33 percent  since
1980.  Since  early  1987,  when Ecuador  was hit  simultaneously  with
43 The author  participated  in a fact-finding  and advisory
mission  tc Ecuador  on behalf  of  the United  Nations  Development
Program  in  October  1988.
49a collapse  of international  oil  prices  and  a severe  earthquake,
the government  has been in suspension  of L.terest  payments  on
commercial  bank debt.  A  "new money" package  was negotiated
between  the  government  and the  banks  in 1987,  but the  agreement
lapsed  when the  banks failed  to come  up with the  full  amount  of
lending  to  which  they  had committed,  and  when it  became  clear  to
the  Ecuadorian  government  that  even  were  the  money  available,  the
remaining interest  servicing  due under the agreement  was far
beyond  the  government's  capacity.
A  new  government  came into  power  in  August  1988,  inheriting
the  debt  suspension,  a macroee!onomic  mess (negative  net  reserves,
inflation  rates  of  nearly  100  percent,  and  stagnant  growth  in  the
non-oil  economy),  and  an extremely  difficult  political  situation,
with deep polarization  and unrest.  The government  immediately
implemented  strong  stabilization  measures  designed  to  reduce  the
budget deficit and to unify the exchange  rate at a realistic
rate.  It also  charted  out  a path  of longer-term  reforms. At the
same time, the  government  announced  its intention  to pursue
negotiations  with the  creditor  banks in search  of a fundamental
solution  to  the  external  debt  problem,  rather  than  another  short-
term  patch-up.  Importantly,  the  new government  has  expressed  its
eagerness  to pursue  lending  progrars  with the IMF and the  World
Bank,  and to submit  to the  conditionality  of those  institutions.
With  a debt-GNP  ratio  of  about  140  percent,  Ecuador  presents
a clear  case for  debt reduction. The secondary  market  value  of
the debt stands  at 13 cents on the dollar (as of January 5,
501989).  Both  measures  suggest  that the  debt  burden  will  have to
be reduced  significantly  and  permanently  as a basis  for  economic
recovery. Of course,  a detailed  estimate  of reasonable  capacity
to pay, with due attention  to social,  political,,  and budgetary
considerations,  would  be needed  to fix  an appropriate  target  for
debt  reduction.
The  IMF and World Bank will face a decision  vis-a-vis
Ecuador  in the near future.  Ecuador is requesting  a standby
agreement  with tha IMF, and as usual,  the IMF  will recommend  a
progcam  of fiscal  austerity  for the  country. The nature  of the
program, however, will  depend fundamental  on  the  Fund's
treatment  of the  Ecuadorean  debt.  If  the  Fund  treats  the  debt in
a  normal bureaucratic  manner as requiring full servicing  at
market interest  rates, then the Fund will determine  that the
Covernment  of Ecuador  has a gaping  budget  deficit  of more than  8
percent of  GNP.  It will recommend a  program of  crushing
austerity,  in  order  _nat  the  government  generate  the  resources  to
service  the interest.  If the  government  actually  tried  to follow
such  a program,  it  would surely  plunge  the  country  into  serious
political  unrest.
If instead  the Fund acknowledges  that the interest  cannot
seriously  be considered  as payable,  it will determine  that the
budget  is  close  to  balance, once  allowance is  made  for
substantial  debt  reduction.  Most  of the  definition  of the  budget
deficit, and  the  need for  austerity,  will  depend on  one's
accounting  of the 8.5 percent  of GNP that is due in commercial
51bank interest  servicing  each  year.
The Fund might  believe  that  it can duck this  determination
altogether,  by  deciding that Ecuador must  arrange adequate
financing  or debt  reduction  with the  banks  before  an IMF  program
can be established. But in this case,  the Fund is essentially
condemning  Ecuador to respect  its debt payments  or choose  the
path of  ostracism from  the official financial  community  by
failing  to conclude  an IMF program.  If the banks know that
Ecuador  must choose  between  signing  a bank agreement  or walking
away from a Fund  program,  the  banks  will certainly  be unwilling
to  explore  any  serious  options  regarding  debt  reduction.
In  sum, the  IMF  can  push the  process  rf debt  reduction  only
by acknowledging  (either  implicitly  or explicitly)  the  need for
debt reduction,  and then giving  Ecuador  the  time to uegotiate  a
program  of debt reduction. To do this,  the IMF must extend  a
program  to  Ecuador.  despite  the  presence  of large  and  growing  bank
arrears,  with the  understanding  that  the  arrears  will  be settled
only  when a long-term  arrangement  is reached  between  Ecuador  and
the  banks.
A final settlement  on Ecuador's  bank debt is not hard to
envision. The  interest  rate  should  be brought  down  to sub-market
rates,  reflecting  the secondary  market  price of Ecuador's  debt
and other  indicators  of capacity  to pay.  These  sub-market  rates
should then be  collateralized  by  a  combination  of  official
guarantees  (e.g.  from  the  World  Bank),  and  perhaps  by the  pledge
52of  future receipts  on oil export earnings.44  The  rate of
interest  could  itself  be indexed  to the  price  of oil,  so that  an
increase  in  oil  prices  leads  to  a rise  in  the  rate  of interest  on
the  loan. Finally,  a "kicker"  might  be attached  to the  new loan,
such that  interest  payments  are increased  in step  with increases
in  GNP  growth  above  a certain  rate.
4.2. The  role  of conditionality  with  debt  reduction
Debt reduction  should  only  be granted  to  countries  pursuing
internationally  supervised programs  of  stabilization and
structural  adjustment.  Especially  in cases in  ,which  official
creditors  are  providing  guarantees  on interest  payments,  there  is
a legitimate  role for conditionality  in protecting  the use of
official financing.  It  is  sometimes suggested that debt
reduction  would take the pressure  off of conditionality,  i.e.
that a  "tight  leash"  on debt is necessary  to make countries
undertake  programs  of economic  reform. Both theory  (e.g.  Sachs,
1989b) and experience  suggest  otherwise.  Debt reduction  can
enhance  the effectiveness  of conditionality  by making  it more
likely  that  a good  government  can  maintain  power,  and  by offering
governments  a  more attractive  incentive  to  pursue a  reform
program.
It would indeed  be prudent  for the official  community  to
44Ecuador  already  has  extensive  experience  with
collateralizing  interest  payments  with future  oil earnings,  in
the form of a special  "oil facility"  with the  commercial  banks
that  was  operative  in  recent  years.
53press for debt reduction  only after a government  has a track
record  of successful  adjustment  efforts  (in  the  meantime,  arrears
on debt repayments  might be a necessary  evil, in lieu of an
adequate  financing  package).  What is important  is  not the  actual
timing of debt reduction,  but the ex ante commitment  by the
official  community  to support  debt reduction  for  any government
in  fact pursues an  effective adjustment  i3rogram  under  the
supervision  of  the  internationaL  financial institutions,  in
circumstances  in which  the debt is  demonstrably  beyond the
political  and  economic  capacity  of the  country  to  pay  in full.
4.3.  Legal  and  regulatory  aspects  of concerted  debt  reduction
Concerted  debt reduction  requires  that  a high  proportion  of
banks agree to a restructuring  of debt at sub-market  interest
rates.  Since  the  sub-market  rates  will  enjoy  credit  enhancement
with official  funds,  the package  of debt reduction  cum credit
enhancement  should  be attractive  to the  vast majority  of banks,
as most of these  banks  are  already  divesting  their  portfolios  on
the  secondary  market  at substantial  discounts.  Furthermore,  as a
practical  matter,  the  difficulty  will lie in gaining  the  assent
of the  biggest  banks in the  steering  committee,  rather  than  the
smaller  banks. 45
451nterestingly,  this  is  nearly  the  opposite  of the  case of
concerted  lending,  in which the  big banks  participate  while  the
smaller  banks attempt to avoid  participation. In the case of
debt reduction,  the  smaller  banks  will  on the  whole  be delighted
to be done  with the  problem,  and  have  demonstrated  a willingness
54In my  view,  the  difficulties  of  achieving a  concerted
settlement  are  vastly  overstated.  The  big  problems  have already
been mentioned:  given current regulatory  and official  lending
policies,  the  big banks  have  no particular  reason  to concede  to
relief now.  Once  the  official policies change, then  the
incentives  facing  the  large  banks  will  change  as well.  The  main
changes  needed  are fourfold:  (1)  an end to official  bailouts  of
interest  servicing;  (2) a tolerance  of interest  arrears  in the
course of debt negotiations;  (3) a regulatory  environment  in
which  book profits  look  better  if the  banks  agree  to a concerted
debt reduction;  and  (4) official  money available  for credit
enhancement.
Complete  unanimity  among the  banks would not generally  be
required to  achieve a  concerted restructuring.  The  debt
contracts  of each country allow for debt restructurings  with
various  qualified  majorities  of creditor  banks, in some cases
two-thirds  of the banks, in other cases three-fourths,  and in
some,  simple  majorities.
It is important  to keep in mind,  as well,  that  even if the
regulatory  changes  fail  to  break  the  logjam,  there  are some  "big
guns"  in the  official  policy  arsenal  that  can  do the  job.  There
is in fact  a "neutron  bomb"  of debt  contracts  that  would  destroy
the old contracts,  and yet leave the  debtors  standing. It has
been  described  recently  as follows:
to  accept  losses.
55There is  a provision  under  the  IMF  articles  (Article  VIII),
which would provide for an arrangement  of payments  and
exchange restrictions  approved by  it  to  supersede all
previous  arrangements,  and  which  could  not  be challenged  in
the courts of any of its members.  Thus, if some banks
refust,  to  participate  in  an IMF  approved  arrangement,  and  if
the debtor countries  discriminate  against  those  banks and
met their  obligations  only  after  meeting  those  of the  banks
which participate  in the arrangement,  the latter  are given
effectively a  senior status, which  the  former cannot
challenge.46
Within the  U.S., similar  policy  options  exist,  as shown  by
the  legal  history  of Allied  Bank  vs.  Costa  Rica,  in  which  a  U.S.
bank attempted  to sue Costa  Rica for  nonpayments  on a sovereign
debt  contract.  In  the  first decision of  the  court  (566
F.Suppl440),  the  court  ruled  in  favor  of Costa  Rica,  and  refused
to enforce the contract  on behalf of the plaintiffs,  on the
grounds of  a  doctrine known as "state action".  The court
essentially  held that as long as Costa  Rica's actions  in not
paying were fully supported  by the U.S. Government,  then the
courts would not  enforce a  judgement  against Costa Rica in
support of U.S. foreign  policy interests.  In the event, the
court  later  reversed  itself  (Allied  vs.  Costa  Rica,  567  F.2d  516)
when the U.S. Government  made clear  that in fact it would  like
Costa Rica to pay the debt. 47 But the point here is not the
46See Arjun K. Sengupta,  "The  LDC Debt Problem:  Some
Reflections  on the Proposed  Solutions",  December  12,  1988,
speech  delivered  at the  Japanese  Economic  Planning  Agency,
p.  9.
47The ironies  here  are  wonderful,  since  the  court  originally
took  it  as a matter  of course  that  the  U.S.  Government  would  want
Costa  Rica to  enjoy  relief  on the  debt.  Judiciary,  meet  the  Baker
Planl
56final  resolution of  the  case,  but  the  fact  that  the
enforceability  of  contracts  by  the banks appears to depend
importantly  on the  U.S. policy  position  on the debt contracts.
This  is  leverage  that  can  be held  in  reserve.
5.  Conclusions
This paper has  stressed that effective debt management
should  mimic two  of the  essential  characteristics  of bankruptcy:
the debt burden should be reduced,  and all creditors  should
participate  in a concerted  settlement. The paper suggests,  at
some length,  why the "new  money"  approach  has broken  down, and
stresses  that even while it may work (occassionally)  for the
largest  countries,  it simply  does not function  at all for the
smaller  debtors. The  paper  also  casts  doubt  on the  efficacy  of
the "voluntary"  approach  to debt reduction,  in which  individual
creditors  are permitted  to choose  whether  or not to participate
in  a debt  reduction  scheme. Such  voluntary  arrangements  make  as
much sense as voluntary  bankruptcy,  that is, not very much.
There  are  simply  too  many  obstacles  (e.g.  inherent  externalities,
distorted  incentives  of the largest  banks,  etc.) to give much
hope to a fully  decentralized  market  approach  to debt reduction.
The  most  efficient and  straightforward  form  of  debt
reduction  would  be a rescheduling  of  existing  debt  at sub-market
interest  rates.  The official  creditors  could  play an important
role in the process by providing  official  guarantees  on the
interest  rates after they have been reduced.  There are many
57important  steps that could  be taken  by tbe  policy  community  to
bring about a settlement  on this basis, including  regulatory
changes,  and  changes  in  the  lending  policies  of the  international
financial  institutions.  The  regulators  should  be more  aggressive
in requiring  banks to set  aside  allocated  reserves  on their  LDC
debt, so that  distortions  in  book valuations  of  LDC debt  do not
create  disincentives  to  debt  reduction. Also,  the  international
financial  institutions  should  recognize  that  interest  arrearages
can be a normal  part,  and perhaps  are  an inevitable  part,  of a
process  leading  towards  debt  reduction.
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